Introduction
Statistical methods for the analysis of data can be classed as descriptive or as probabilistic. The former methods include tabulation and graphical display, of great importance both in detailed analysis and also in presentation of conclusions. Probability enters statistical analysis in various ways. The most obvious is that one recognizes explicitly that conclusions drawn from limited data are uncertain and that therefore it is a good thing to measure and control probabilities of drawing the wrong conclusions, partly, but by no means solely, as a precaution against overinterpretation. The statistical significance test is the most widely known device concerned with such probabilities and is the subject of the present paper.
The nature, use and misuse of significance tests have been much discussed in both statistical and nonstatistical circles. The view taken in this paper is that such tests play an important but nevertheless strictly limited role in the critical analysis of data.
There is an extensive mathematical literature on the theory of such tests and on the distributions appropriate for special tests. The mathematics can largely be separated from critical discussion of the underlying concepts, that being the concern of the present paper.
Nature of statistical significance tests
The first element in a significance test is the formulation of a hypothesis to be tested, often called the null hypothesis. It may help to consider first how to proceed when random variation can be ignored. We might, for instance, be interested in a hypothesis about how some biological mechanism 'really works'. We would do the following:
(i) Find one (or more) test observations (or sets of observations) whose values can be predicted from the hypothesis under examination. For instance the hypothesis might predict that a certain set of relationships between 'response' and log dose are in fact parallel straight lines. The test observations would then be such as to allow assessments of nonlinearity and nonparallelism.
(ii) Make (ii) Calculate the value of the test statistic for the available data.
(iii) If the test statistic is in the extreme of its probability distribution under the null hypothesis, there is evidence that the null hypothesis is untrue. If the test statistic is in the centre of its distribution, the data are consistent with the null hypothesis.
More quantitatively, we calculate from the distribution of the test statistic, the probability P that a deviation would arise by chance as or more extreme than that actually observed, the null hypothesis being true. The value of P is called the (achieved) significance level. If P < 0.05, we say the departure is significant at the 0.05 level, if P < 0.01 that the departure is significant at the 0.01 level, and so on. In applications it is nearly always enough to find P fairly roughly.
A There has been some controversy as to which is appropriate when a priori we expect any difference to favour D and this expectation is confirmed in the data. To an appreciable extent the matter is one of convention. In reading the literature, check to see which has been used. In the present paper we use two-sided tests and leave the matter with the following brief comments.
(a) In some problems the two-sided P is clearly appropriate, because neither direction of e.fect is biologically impossible.
(b) It will be rather rare that a substantial observed effect in an unexpected direction can be dismissed without discussion. Further, retrospective explanations of unexpected effects can often be put forward. These are the arguments for regarding the two-sided test as the one for routine use.
(c) It is largely conventional whether one says that the two-sided P is say 0.1 and the effect is in the expected (or unexpected) direction, or whether one quotes the one-sided P of 0.05.
Section 3 describes the nature of null hypotheses, and we then go on to discuss various points of interpretation. (ii) Failure to achieve an interesting level of statistical significance, i.e. the observation of values reasonably consistent with the null hypothesis, does not mean that practically important differences are absent. Thus in the Example of Section 2 the observation of 55 preferences for D and 45 for C would lead to Ptwo-sided = 0.37 and to the conclusion that the data are just such as to be expected if the null hypothesis were true. On the other hand it can be shown that long run effects ranging from 45% to 65% preferences for D are consistent with the data (at the 5% significance level) and, depending entirely on the context, these might correspond to differences of practical importance. By constrast with 1000 patients a split 550 for D and 450 for C would be a highly significant departure from the null hypothesis (two-sided = 0.0018), the range of preference for D consistent with the data is from 52% to 58% and yet it might well be that these would all be of little practical importance. In this instance the direction of the effect is firmly established but its magnitude is such as to make the effect of little practical importance; such instances of observational overkill are probably rare in clinical trials.
(iii) The strong implication of (ii) in principle the scale of investigation could be settled by decision analysis, costing the effort spent in the study and the consequences of wrong decisions. This is but part of the broader issue of the role of formal decision analysis in medical work, and a brief comment on this follows.
Relation with decision analysis
An accompanying paper in this series (Spicer, 1982) deals with the interesting topic of decision analysis in a medical context. Superficially there is a connexion between the so-called two decision problem, i.e. deciding between the two alternative courses of action, and the significance test of an appropriate null hypothesis. In fact, at least from the viewpoint of the present paper, the procedures are best regarded as quite distinct. The significance test is concerned with some aspects of assessing information provided by an investigation. A decision or diagnostic rule indicates an appropriate action, based on a synthesis of the information provided by data, of so-called prior information available from other sources and of utilities measuring the consequences of various actions in given circumstances. The decision rule requires a greater variety of quantitative input than does a significance test and in a sense reaches a correspondingly stronger conclusion.
Reference SPICER, C.L. (1982) . Statistical decision theory and clinical trials. Br. J. clin. Pharmac., 14 (in press).
Appendix
Some further issues, including some idealised misconceptions
There follow a few statements involving significance tests, together with brief comments. Probably none of A-C has ever been made in quite the form given here, but the statements may nevertheless pinpoint potential errors of interpretation. D and E outline some further issues of importance, marginal to the main theme of the paper. By 'effect' is meant, for example, a difference in survival rate as between two alternative regimes. The null hypothesis is that this difference is zero.
A. The effect is significant at the 1% level: that is, the probability ofthe null hypotheses ofzero effect is only 1%. E. The Bayesian approach to statistical tests allows the incorporation of external evidence, that is always available, and avoids the conceptual difficulties of ordinary significance tests. It would be out of place in the present paper to write at length on the foundations of statistical inference. These foundations have for many years been under active discussion and debate: such discussion should be taken as evidence of the intellectual vigour of the subject and not at all as implying an unsoundness in application.
Briefly, significance tests as described in the main part of the paper aim to summarise what the data tell about consistency with a hypothesis or about the direction of an effect. The P-value has, before action or overall conclusion can be reached, to be combined with any external evidence available and, in the case of decision-making, with assessments of the consequences of various actions. Clearly the P-value is a limited aspect: note also point (iii) of some comments on interpretation where the importance of calculating limits of error for the magnitude of an effect is stressed.
It appears superficially very attractive to strengthen interpretation and to bring in the external information, by use of the so-called Bayesian approach. In my opinion, there is room for different approaches in different contexts, but the arguments are fairly persuasive against the Bayesian tests in most applications to the analysis and interpretation of data. First it may often help to keep separate the impact of data and external information. Secondly, to put the external information in the required quantitative form raises formidable conceptual and practical difficulties. (In some cases, such as certain problems of diagnosis, external information is in the form of a statistical frequency, and then there is no dispute that the Bayesian approach should be applied.)
Finally in problems in which the direction of an effect is under study and the external information is relatively weak, the one-sided P value is approximately the (Bayesian) probability that the time effect has the opposite sign to the effect in the data and the two approaches are largely reconciled.
